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Almost five years have passed
since the breakup of Czecho
Slovakia on Dec. 31, 1992. It may
not be too early to start the
process of appraising the role
played by Vaclav Havel in the
Czech-Slovak constitutional
negotiations that ended in the
dismantling of the state. While
most records of the last crucial
phase are not available as yet,
some direct participants are
prepared to talk about their
experience. Moreover, because
the time elapsed is relatively
short, the historic reality of the
outcome has not settled so firmly
as to make difficult a
consideration of alternative
choices of conduct that might
have been available at critical
stages of the negotiations.

-

BY ERIC STEIN

The Jallowing essay is based on the booh,
Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict,
Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated
Breakup, recently published by
University of Michigan Press, © 1997.

Publication is by permission.
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With great personal courage
he was able to co~front the
Communist regime, anct after its
collapse, to articulate aftfully the
ideals and ills of his evolving
new society and of modern
democracy in general.

Havel'.s position as the last federal
President bristled with paradoxes relating
both to his persona and to his political
activities. His performance - and his
writings - disclose a deep ambiguity
toward power. As a product of the Czech
bourgeoisie who enjoys the small pleasures
of the "little Czech man," and as an artist at
heart, he denies "any desire for power or
love of it," and is horrified by its
temptations, according to author Marian
Lesko. Yet power holds a fascination for
him, a gate to a great adventure in which a
simple lad of the Czech folktale becomes a
powerful king. Yet again, during a
University ceremony at which he was given
an honorary degree, he confessed to
expecting at any moment one of the
familiar men from Kafkas "castle" to enter,
wrench his freshly acquired diploma from
his hand and evict him from the aula as an
impostor. Although he appears from the
outside as the very "antipode" of Josef K.,
his sense of non-belonging and self doubt
is, he suggests, the motor propelling him
into the most unlikely exploits such as the
Presidency. Yet again - and finally - this
alienated modem intellectual believes
strongly in a transcendental Being as a
measure of all human values and
individual responsibility; any societal
change, in his view, must come from
within the individual.
With great personal courage he was able
to confront the Communist regime, and
after its collapse, to articulate artfully the
ideals and ills of his evolving new society
and of modem democracy in general. He
emerged after 1989 with great prestige, but
with the sole experience of a dissident
totally excluded from the public political
process, confined to the world of
samizdats, secret get-togethers of kindred
souls, seminars and theatrical happenings
in private apartments, all under the
ubiquitous eye of the Big Brother, and in

the end - a prison cell. He has described
this pitiful caricature of "public life" as
"anti" or "non-political politics" which
allowed him to preserve his personal
integrity but did not prepare him for high
office in a democracy.
His critics have charged - and he has
vehemently denied - that he consciously
continued to adhere to the "non-political
politics" in his new environment because of
his aversion, on moral gounds, to the
normal give-and-take of the political
process. Again, Havels critics point to his
public pronouncements evidencing a
degree of diffidence toward traditional
political parties, which he has explained by
the experience in the First Republic where
the ruling political parties, with their own
press, labor unions, cooperatives, sport and
education facilities, exerted excessive
influence over the life of the country. This
posture, it is said with some justification,
must have inspired the 1990 election
slogan "parties are for partisans, the Civic
Forum is for all." He was a founder of the
Civic Forum, a dominant political force
after 1989.
There has been little comment on the
way in which Havel orchestrated the first
phase of the negotiations for a new federal
constitution, starting with his meeting in a
Prague pub with Slovak Prime Minister
Vladimir Meciar and extending over the
many peregrinations "from castles to
manors" in 1990 and early 1991. In the
nominally tripartite negotiations (the
spokesmen of the federal and of the two
component Republics) the "federals" and
the Czechs tended toward common
positions as against the Slovaks; Havel, as a
high federal organ and a Czech could not
be disassociated from one of the parties. He
is blamed in the first place, for having
promised Meciar a re-allocation of
competences between the federation and
the Republics to be enacted promptly in
advance of the new constitution because, it
is said, he could not conceive that a
parliament, elected under the Communist
regime, could frame a democratic
constitution. With his influence at its peak,
he might have been able to force an

agreement on a full constitution at that
time. However, he was not given enough
time to acquire the indispensable skills of
1
working with the fragile, groping
institutions which were the ultimate
arbiters of the constitutional issues, or to
strike out on an extra-constitutional route.
He never succeeded in forming a good
working relationship with Alexander
Dubcek, the Slovak leader of the 1968
Communist reform movement and the
kindly, but not very effective, Chairman of
the Federal Assembly, or with its important
committees. As his staff, Havel brought
with him to "the Castle" people whom he
met primarily as dissident journalists,
artists and musicians, who shared his
beliefs and excelled in their dedication and
enthusiasm rather than in competence for
governmental affairs. Yet, if one listens to
his first Chancellor, persons with the
needed background and training were
simply not available, particularly if "the
ruling circles" of the old regime were to be
excluded. Havel remains fiercely loyal to
his "old time friends" and collaborators and
- as President of the independent Czech
Republic since January 1993 - promotes
them to positions for which, at times, they
are not suited.
When he first came into federal office,
Havel was impressed by "the unusually
extensive powers of the President, almost
as extensive as in the so-called presidential
system" and he felt that in a new
constitution "the power of the President
could still be somewhat weakened." Not
long thereafter, however, when in the
course of his learning process he became
aware of the increasing divisions in the
Parliament and of the serious threat of an
unresolvable deadlock due to the
unworkability of the prevailing Communist
Constitution, he proposed a series of
legislative measures including a bill for
increasing his powers. With one exception,
all of these proposals failed of adoption.
Herman Chromy, a former deputy in the
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federal Parliament and Havels ardent
supporter, deplored the Presidents isolation
and described the circumstances of the
failure of his legislative initiative:

In July 1992, minutes
after the Slovak
Parliament adopted the
so-called Declaration of
Sovereignty of the
Slovak Republic,
admittedly a purely
symbolic gesture, Havel
resigned from his
office. He was accused
of "having left the
sinking ship" and
thereby hastened the
breakup of the state
because he had already
accepted it as
inevitable and wished
to avoid being placed
in a position that might
compromise his
chances for election to
the presidency of the
new Czech state.
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Some of the advisors acted as if they did
not know (or did not want to know),
what they were really expected to defend in
parliamentary committees . ... The high
distinction and erudition of Professor
Klokocka (a Czech emigre law professor at
the University of Munich and a consultant
to the President) were for a number of
deputies . .. unintelligible talk. Most of the
deputies shunned his seminars on . .. the
premises of the Parliament.
When the negotiations under the
Presidents patronage ran into the ground
and the representatives of the two Republic
Parliaments took over, Havel continued to
"intervene" at the margin. Concerned about
the lack of progress in the talks between
the parliamentarians, Havel offered his own
draft of a federal constitution and, in
November 1991, proposed that the Czech
side accept the Slovak demands on the
deadlocked formal issues relating to the
parties and legal nature of a treaty to be
concluded by the two component
Republics as a new foundation of the
common state. The Czech side, however,
almost unanimously recoiled against this
suggestion with varying degrees of sincere
or feigned horror.

Finally, in November 1991 , when
another series of his constitutional
proposals was in dire distress in the
Federal Assembly, Havel decided to appeal
to the citizens over the heads of the
parliamentarians. He was encouraged to
take this risky route by more than two
million signatures (mostly Czech) on a
petition urging the preservation of the
common state. Some thousands of Prague
citizens responded in a manifestation at the
historic Vaclavske Square. It was perhaps at
this point that the President had to decide
whether to come out openly in support of
a looser, "confederate" structure of the state
demanded by the Slovak negotiators. Such
a move would have brought him into a
direct confrontation with the newly
emerging Czech team lead by Vaclav Klaus.
Shortly after the first mass meeting, Havel
declared that there was no need for further
demonstrations, leaving behind a feeling of
disappointment and - more important an irritated Parliament, which then
proceeded to defeat again his proposals for
breaking the constitutional logjam. With
the bulk of the Czech population more or
less indifferent and the Slovaks generally
distrustful of him, it is not at all clear what
would have happened if Havel had decided ·
to continue his campaign for popular
support.
When the President ran for reelection in
the summer of 1992 he was repeatedly
defeated in the Federal Assembly by the
Slovak vote. His relationship with Slovakia
was not an easy one. His original eight
advisors included only one Slovak, who left
after six months. At the outset, Havel was
no less ignorant of the Slovak situation
than any other Czech intellectual and no
less surprised at the outburst of Slovak
nationalist rhetoric during the early
parliamentary debate on the new name for
the federation. On one of his visits to
Bratislava he was forcibly prevented from
speaking by Slovak separatists. More
important, he earned the undying hostility
of the Slovak Prime Minister Meciar, first,
because he was said to have opposed
Meciars appointment to a high federal
office, then because of the alleged
involvement of "the Castle" in Meciars
"first" removal from the office of Slovak

Prime Minister, and finally because in his
appeal before the 1992 elections he
abjured the voters by clear implication
from voting for Meciars new pany, which
nevenheless received the highest number
of votes in Slovakia. Meciar, "who never
forgets or forgives," tried to use Havels
office as a bargaining chip with Vaclav
Klaus, by then leader of the strongest
Czech pany and his negotiating
protagonist, but Klaus refused.
In July 1992, minutes after the Slovak
Parliament adopted the so-called
Declaration of Sovereignty of the Slovak
Republic, admittedly a purely symbolic
gesture, Havel resigned from his office. He
was accused of "having left the sinking
ship" and thereby hastened the breakup of
the state because he had already accepted it
as inevitable and wished to avoid being
placed in a position that might
compromise his chances for election to the
presidency of the new Czech state. Yet
under the circumstances his withdrawal a
few weeks before the expiration of his term
appeared understandable. This, many of
his friends thought, marked the end of the
politician and the rebirth of the artist.
However, after a period of "summer
meditations" in his country cottage, private
citizen Havel plunged into energetic
consultations with both the new coalition
panies and the opposition on the left. He
sought to facilitate the passage of the
constitutional legislation on the
termination of the state in the deadlocked
federal Parliament, at one point briefly
suggesting an extra-constitutional
procedure, not to save the common state
but to end it quickly and peacefully. With
that objective in mind, he abandoned his
earlier commitment to both the common
state and to a national referendum.
At the same time, he intervened actively
and with limited success in the ongoing
negotiations for a new Czech Constitution,
often airing the views of the opposition.
Contrary to the position of Klaus' pany, he
advocated a direct election of the Czech
President by the people in order to
strengthen the authority of that office. His
view did not prevail, but he carefully
avoided an open confrontation. Having
decided to run for the Czech Presidency, he
was well aware that Klaus' suppon was
essential. In January 1993, he was in fact
elected Presideht of the newly independent
Czech RepubliJ.by a large majority of the
Czech Parliament.

Although sincerely dedicated to the
preservation of the Czech-Slovak state,
Havel was unable to sustain that objective.
This, however, is only one perspective from
which to view his role. His is a moving
story of a courageous struggle to preserve
personal integrity under the Communist
regime, learning and adapting with some
difficulty and mixed success to the postCommunist world, of living with internal
conflicts, of corning to terms with his own
limitations, of making difficult judgments
of "the reality" calling for often distasteful
compromises.
One might think about a parallel with
Abraham Lincoln, the consummate lawyerpolitician. Could Havel have done more to
uphold the "union"? Lincoln acted from a
solid political base established by his
partys victory in the national elections of
1860. Havels great prestige was reduced by
a series of failed initiatives and missteps in
Slovakia, and his influence was gravely
impaired by the 1992 elections, which
swept most of his supponers from the
political scene. Lincoln seized on a
compelling idea, the necessity to salvage
the novel American experiment in
governance, the federal republic, "the city
on the hill" of the early tradition,
beckoning the people longing for freedom
everywhere. He employed this theme,
buttressed subsequently by the call for the
abolition of slavery, with great skill. Havel,
with no experience in politics, had no
program of comparable potency, no
nationally based political pany. Perhaps the
most apt analogy is to the position held by
the aging King Oscar II in 1905 as he
presided over the peaceful dissolution of
the Swedish-Norwegian state when
Norway decided to leave the union.
Today, as President of the newly born
state, Havel remains the most respected
public figure in the Czech Republic. He
and the Czech Prime Minister Klaus have
established a delicate but apparently stable
relationship. The Prime Minister, both
because of his constitutional position and
his assertive ways, has been the undisputed
leading force. But Havel has made full use
of the prerogative of his office, having
vetoed several bills adopted by the
Parliament. Unlike the German Federal
President, who keeps aloof from daily
squabbles, he has commented with
abandon on any issue before the public,

even castigating the bureaucrats for
overcharging Tom Cruises Mission:
Impossible film crew for the rent of a palace
in Prague. Some believe he is trivializing
the high office, yet the people at large
applaud and deluge him with petitions.
He has not hesitated to criticize the
government at the risk of exacerbating
divisions within the coalition. This
evidently has posed a challenge to the
Prime Ministers self restraint. With Havel
I
articulating the moral values and Klaus,
"the pragmatist," the Czechs have enjoyed
a remarkable political stability during the
important early years of the independent
Republic.
Historians will have to address the
question of whether Havel - in the face of
prevailing reality - could have done more
to save the Czech-Slovak state, and
whether his efforts would have made a
difference in the outcome. If I am cornered
with a demand to answer this question, I
would respond that it was not within
Vaclav Havels power to avert the breakup.
The structure prevailed over the "hero"
even though in the final phase the drama
was played out by other heroes (or villains,
depending on the beholders view).
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